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Tuition Residence Requirements:
A Second Look in Light of
Zobel and Martinez
INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970's the constitutionality of tuition residence requirements
generated a great deal of debate among legal scholars.' A pervasive feeling
existed that residence requirements might work grave injustices in certain
circumstances. 2 This sentiment, which energized the legal discourse, probably
stemmed from a variety of sources. For example, the perception of injustice
may have flowed partially from the notion that education, despite Supreme
Court pronouncements to the contrary, 3 was in some way a "fundamental
right." Similarly, the realization that a college education was becoming a
virtual "necessity" for survival in our rapidly changing modern economy
may help explain the concern that such requirements might be unjust. Finally,
the skyrocketing cost of a college education may have contributed to the
fear of injustice. 4 From whatever source the perception derived, even a
cursory examination of the literature generated in this area reveals that the
cost and availability of higher education greatly interested many legal scholars.
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions will likely revitalize
the long-dormant interest in the constitutionality of tuition residence requirements. The Supreme Court's analysis in Zobel v. Williams. and Martinez
v. Bynum6 appears to undercut much of the judicial logic that upheld
tuition residence requirements in the past. In so doing, these cases shed

1. Some of the more thoughtful articles include: Spencer, The Legal Aspects of the
Nonresident Tuition Fee, 6 OR. L. REv. 332 (1927); Note, Residence Requirementsfor Tuition:
An Unsolved Dilemma, 6 IND. L. REv. 283 (1972); Note, The Constitutionalityof Resident!
Non-Resident Tuition Differentials, 24 S.C.L. Rsv. 398 (1972); Comment, Nonresident Tuition
Charged By State Universities in Review, 38 UMKC L. Rav. 341 (1970).
2. As, for example, if such a requirement effectively precluded a student from ever acquiring
in-state status while still a student. For a recognition of this problem see Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973).
3. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4. In addition to generally rising costs, nonresidents, depending on the institution, may
be required to pay from one and one quarter to more than three times the tuition charged a
resident student attending the same institution. Note, The Constitutionality of Resident/NonResident Tuition Differentials, 24 S.C.L. Rv. 398 (1972).
5. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
6. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
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considerable doubt on the validity of the penalty analysis developed in
Shapiro v. Thompson 7 and its progeny, at least as applied to durational
residence requirement for tuition purposes. This Note suggests that the
Supreme Court has, in fact, abandoned much of the analysis employed in
earlier decisions upholding tuition residence requirements' and has adopted
a new line of reasoning that renders certain current tuition residence requirements unconstitutional. In effect, Zobel and Martinez recharacterize
previous cases dealing with durational residence requirements and imply that
any durational residence requirement is constitutionally invalid except to the
extent that it serves solely as a test of bona fide residence. 9 Because certain
tuition residence requirements are much more restrictive than necessary to
merely assure that a person is a bona fide resident,' 0 they may be invalid
in light of Zobel and Martinez. More specifically, this Note argues that a
one-year tuition residence reuirement augmented by a provision refusing to
count time spent in the state for the predominant purpose of attending a
university towards the specified waiting period is unconstitutional.
Part I of this Note traces the evolution of the case law in the area of
tuition residence requirements to clarify the underpinnings of the present
state of the law. Part II then discusses the two recent cases of Zobel and
Martinez and their potential impact in analyzing the constitutionality of
present tuition residence requirements. Part III of the Note concludes by
suggesting that the Supreme Court in Zobel and Martinez abandoned the
rationale underlying early decisions in this area, and in so doing, paved the
way for a renewed attack on the constitutionality of certain tuition residence
requirements. Namely, tuition residence requirements falling into a grey area
beyond the one-year durational residence requirement which the Supreme
Court in Zobel explicitly held to be a valid test of bona fide residence, may
be unconstitutional."

I.

TUITION RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS: AN OVERVIEW
A.

The Residence Requirement

Although many students have attacked the constitutionality of tuition
residence requirements in the past 15 years,' 2 it is a widely accepted practice

7. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
8. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn.

1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78
Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
9. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 64 n.13; Martinez, 461 U.S. at 325.
10. For example, a residence requirement imposing a one-year waiting period, but refusing
to count physical presence in the State for the predominant purpose of attending college or
university towards that waiting period, effectively precludes a student from ever acquiring instate status while in college. Such a requirement precludes all students who enroll from out of
state and later become bona fide residents from ever acquiring in-state status, and thus is more
restrictive than necessary to test the bona tides of a person's residency.
1I.See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., cases discussed infra Parts II-B & II-D.
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for tax-supported universities to differentiate among students with respect
to tuition on the basis of residence.' 3 Rather than focusing on the validity
of this differentiation, however, the controversy now focuses on the prerequisites to establishing in-state status. Most universities require that students
be "residents" of, or "legally domiciled" in, the state where the university
is located.' 4 Universities generally implement the requirement in the form of
a durational residence requirement which demands actual presence within
the state for six months to one year prior to enrollment. 5 Other states
enhance this restriction by refusing to count towards the specified waiting
period time spent in the state for the predominant purpose of attending a
university./6
Durational residence requirements such as these specify that a person must
reside in a state for a certain period of time before demanding the privileges
restricted to state residents. 7 Bona fide residence reqirements, on the other
hand, merely require that a person does establish residency before demanding
resident privileges.' In order to be a bona fide resident, a person must
essentially meet the requirements for domicile. Namely, the person must be
present in the state with the intent to remain indefinitely. 9
The logic underlying durational residence reqirements is that they assure
that the student intends to remain in the state indefinitely and is not temporarily in the state for the sole purpose of securing the benefits of the
state's higher education facilities."0 That is, the durational residence requirement is justified as a measure to determine whether the student is in fact a
bona fide resident. The effect of such durational residence reqirements,
however, is to create two distinct "nonresident" categories: (1) true nonresidents - citizens of states other than the one where the university is

13. See generally Spencer, The Legal Aspects of the Nonresident Tuition Fee, 6 OR. L.

REV. 332 (1927). See also Note, Residence Requirementsfor Tuition: An Unsolved Dilemma,
6 IND. L. REv. 283 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Residence Requirements for Tuition];
Note, The Constitutionality of Resident/Non-Resident Tuition Differentials, 24 S.C.L. REv.
398 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Resident/Non-Resident Tuition Differentials].
14. Note, Residence Requirementsfor Tuition, supra note 13, at 284. For tuition purposes

"domicile" and "residence" are generally treated as synonomous. The concepts are distinguishable, however. Domicile requires physical presence at a place with intent to remain
indefinitely, whereas residence generally requires less stringent connections with the state. Id.

at 284 n.8.
15. Id. at 284.
16. Indiana's tuition residence requirement provides an example of such a scheme. INDIANA
INDIANA UNIVERsITY STUDENT HANDBOOK, Rules Determining Resident and Nonresident Student Status for Indiana University Fee Purposes (1984). See infra note 213.
17. Martinez, 461 U.S. at 329.

UNIVERSITY,

18. Id. at 329-30.
19. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.

20. Requiring a student to maintain residence within the state for one year constitutes "an
evidence of the bona fides of his intention to remain a permanent resident of the state and
that he is not temporarily residing within the state for the mere purpose of securing the
advantages of the university." Bryan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 188 Cal. 559, 561-62, 205
P. 1071, 1072 (1922).
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located; and (2) bona fide residents - citizens of the state where the university is located who have not yet lived in the state for the requisite time
period, and who therefore do not qualify for in-state tuition rates. 2' As
noted above, Zobel and Martinez are extremely important in the area of
durational residence requirements because they explain this connection between durational and bona fide residence requirements and require that such
waiting periods do no more than assure domicile in a particular state. 22 Any
durational residence requirement which does more than provide a test of
bona fide residence may be unconstitutional.
Before analyzing the decisions leading the law to its present state, it is
important to note that, generally, a state need not give nonresidents all the
benefits provided for its residents. 23 All citizens of the state are, however,
entitled to equal protection regardless of the length of their residency. 24 The
constitutionality of any residence requirements creating distinctions between
classes of residents must therefore be analyzed under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 25 The more complex question, and the
one courts struggle with in the area of residence requirements, concerns the
standard of scrutiny to be applied. Generally, in examining classifications
challenged on constitutional grounds, courts require that disparate treatment
not be arbitrary and that the classification be reasonably related to some
valid governmental purpose. 26 If, however, the classification has some effect
on the exercise of a "fundamental right," ' 27 or if the classification is based
upon a "suspect class" such as race, 28 the statute will be upheld only if it
passes strict judicial scrutiny. In order to pass such scrutiny, the statutory
classification must be "necessary to promote a compelling state interest." 29

21. Note, Residence Requirements for Tuition, supra note 13, at 285.
22. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325-30 (1983).
Zobel and Martinez in essence recharacterize previous cases dealing with residence requirements
as requiring that such residence requirements do no more than test the bona fides of a person's
residency.
23. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898); American Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt,
279 F. Supp. 40, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969).
24. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires uniform treatment
of "persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action" in question. Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
25. Note, Residence Requirements for Tuition, supra note 13, at 286.
26. The Supreme Court first articulated the "rational basis" standard of equal protection
analysis in Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In Lindsley the Court
stated that one who assails a classification on equal protection grounds carries the burden of
showing that the classification "does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary." Id. at 78-79. See also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980).
27. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627. (1969).
28. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627.
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B.

The Early Tuition Cases

Early case law dealing with tuition residence requirements applied the less
demanding form of scrutiny which merely required that the residence requirement not be arbitrary or invidious, thus making it very difficult for a
student to mount a successful challenge. The first case to deal with tuition
residence requirements was the 1922 case of Bryan v. Regents of University
30 In Bryan, the petitioner challenged a California state
of California.
statute
requiring nonresident students to pay a tuition fee not required of residents. 31
The statute defined a nonresident student as one who had not been a bona
fide resident of California for more than one year preceding his entrance
into the university. 32 The petitioner, although a bona fide resident of California, could not register as a resident because her parents had not resided
in California for a full year prior to her enrollment. 33 The petitioner specifically complained that the statute violated the privileges and immunities
clause of the California Constitution in that the legislature lacked a reasonable basis for extending lower tuition rates to bona fide residents of greater
than one year while denying the privilege to bona fide residents of less than
one year. 34 The California Supreme Court upheld the classification as evidence of a student's bona fide intent to remain in the state by comparing
the tuition residence requirement to the one-year waiting period to exercise
the right to vote. 35 The court thus found that the one-year waiting period
36
was not unreasonable or arbitrary.
Following Bryan, the issue of the constitutionality of tuition residence
requirements did not arise again for 38 years. 37 In 1960, the Idaho case of
Newman v. Graham38 resurrected the issue and revived the assault on tuition
residence requirements. The regulation challenged in Newman, however,
presented the court with a slightly different twist to the issue addressed in
Bryan. In Bryan, the regulation did not absolutely deny a student the opportunity to comply with the waiting period while still in college.3 9 The
regulation challenged in Newman, on the other hand, permanently froze a
student's nonresident status for his entire academic career, regardless of the
40
fact that he might at some point become a bona fide resident of the state.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922).
Id. at 560, 205 P. at 1071.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561-62, 205 P. at 1072.
Id.
Note, Resident/Non-Resident Tuition Differentials, supra note 13, at 401.
82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960).
Bryan, 188 Cal. at 560, 205 P. at 1071.
Newman, 82 Idaho at 92, 349 P.2d at 717.
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Because this regulation did not afford students an opportunity to show a
change of resident status, the Idaho Supreme Court, applying state constitutional law, found that it was unreasonable and denied equal protection to
persons of the same class who were similarly situated. 4' In contrast, a later
Colorado case, Landwehr v. Regents of the University of Colorado,42 held
that a regulation similar to that found unconstitutional in Newman was not
arbitrary or unreasonable and therefore did not violate the United States
43
Constitution.
A federal court case following the Newman and Landwehr decisions seems
44
to fall somewhere between these polarized positions. In Clarke v. Redeker,
an Illinois resident entered the University of Iowa as an undergraduate,
married an Iowa resident, and purchased property in Iowa. 41 After becoming,
in essence, a bona fide Iowa resident, he entered Iowa's law school and
requested resident status. 4 The registrar, however, interpreted the residency
regulations to require that his nonresident status continue. 47 The regulation
in question made it virtually impossible to establish residency while in student
status because it created a presumption that an out-of-state student was in
Iowa primarily for educational purposes and would not be considered to
48
have established residence in Iowa.
Plaintiff argued that the Iowa regulation violated the United States Constitution, relying primarily on the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Carrington v. Rash.49 In Carrington, the plaintiff challenged a clause in
the Texas Constitution that denied military personnel the right to vote in
Texas if they first established residency in Texas while serving as a member
of the military. 0 The Court in Carringtonheld that this provision violated

41. Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 719.
42. 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
43. Id. at 5, 396 P.2d at 453. The court failed to set forth any of the reasons for its
holding. It merely held, after citing several cases supporting its view, that the classification was
not arbitrary or unreasonable and was not so lacking in a foundation as to contravene constitutional principles. Id.
44. 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
45. Id. at 120-21.

46. Id.at 120.
47. Id.

48. The regulation read as follows:
A student from another state who has enrolled for a full program, or substantially
a full program, in any type of educational institution will be presumed to be in
Iowa primarily for educational purposes, and will be considered not to have

established residence in Iowa. Continued residence in Iowa during vacation periods
or occasional periods of interruption to the course of study does not of itself
overcome the presumption.
Id. at 121 (emphasis added). The statute is set out at length here because it provides an example
of a regulation which the analysis in this Note suggests may now be unconstitutional in light
of Zobel and Martinez.
49. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
50. Id.
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the equal protection clause because it denied new service members the opportunity of ever controverting the presumption of nonresidence. 5'
The Clarke court distinguished the Texas constitutional provision on the
grounds that the Iowa regulation did not absolutely prevent reclassification
as a resident in appropriate circumstances. 2 The statute merely presumed a
student to be in Iowa for the predominant purpose of obtaining an education.53 Because the court construed the regulation as being rebuttable, it
held that the regulation was not palpably unreasonable or arbitrary. 4 Significantly, the court also held that the legislation was reasonably related to
the state's valid interest in achieving a partial cost equalization between
5
resident and nonresident students. 1
Two conclusions thus emerged from these early cases dealing with tuition
residence requirements under the rational basis standard of scrutiny. First,
a statute or regulation creating an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency,
thereby freezing residency status for the duration of a student's academic
career, would be found unreasonable and would therefore violate the equal
protection clause.5 6 Second, regulations which merely created a rebuttable
57
presumption as to a student's residence would probably be constitutional.
C. New Challenges: Shapiro and its Progeny
In 1969 the Supreme Court, with its decision in Shapiro v. Thompson,"
began to analyze residence reqirements in a new context and placed the
constitutionality of all durational residence requirements in doubt. More specifically, the Court developed a relationship between equal protection and
the right to interstate travel and migration.5 9 The Supreme Court recognized
that citizens have a constitutional right "to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which

51. Id. at 96.
52. 259 F. Supp. at 122.
53. Id. at 121.
54. Id. at 122-23.
55. Id. at 123. The primary justification advanced was that parents or students paid taxes
to support the university. By granting state residents lower tuition rates and charging nonresidents higher rates, the cost of operating the university was more evenly distributed between
the two groups. Id. The Supreme Court later rejected this view in Zobel. See infra notes 17175 and accompanying text.
56. See Clarke, 259 F. Supp. 117.
57. See Bryan, 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071; Landwehr, 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451; Clarke,
259 F. Supp. 117. But see Newman, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716.
58. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
59. The Court further expanded and explained this relationship in Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.""0 Tying this constitutional
right of freedom to travel to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment enabled the Court to apply strict scrutiny to statutes imposing

durational residence requirements. 6' With this development came the prospect
of stricter judicial scrutiny for students wishing to challenge tuition residence

requirements.
In Shapiro, the Court reviewed statutes from the District of Columbia,
Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, all of which imposed one-year durational

residence requirements before new citizens could become eligible for welfare
benefits.6 2 Because the statutes attempted to prevent the poor from immigrating, they implicated the constitutional right to interstate migration. 63 The
Court found that any state restriction that penalized the exercise of that
right had to be supported by compelling government interests.64
Employing this strict standard, the Court struck down the statutes, finding

that the states' proffered interests were not sufficiently compelling.65 The
Court first rejected defendants' argument that the states had a compelling

interest in preventing persons from becoming a continuing burden on state
welfare programs.6 More importantly, at least for the anlaysis of residence
requirements, the Court rejected defendants' suggestion that rewarding older
citizens on the basis of past contributions was a compelling state interest. 67
The Court noted that such reasoning "would permit the State to apportion

60. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629. Although all courts agree that the right to interstate travel
is a constitutional right, courts have disagreed about which specific clause in the Constitution
creates the right. Courts have in the past attributed the right to the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV and the fourteenth amendment, the commerce clause, the due process
clause, and the general notion of national citizenship. Recent Developments, ConstitutionalLawRight to Travel-Validity of Alaska's Income DistributionPlan, 50 TENN. L. REV. 537, 540-41
nn.25-29 (1983).
61. Although the right to interstate travel and migration is a full-fledged "constitutional"
as opposed to a "fundamental" right, the Court employs a similar test when analyzing equal
protection claims arising in cases dealing with the right to travel. As noted previously, when
a statutory classification has some effect on the enjoyment of a fundamental right, it will be
upheld only if the classification is necessary to further a compelling state interest. See supra
notes 22-26 and accompanying text. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 166, at 1000 (1978).
62. 394 U.S. at 618.
63. Although the Court could have decided this case as merely a constitutional right to
travel case, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), the Court was probably justified in
applying equal protection analysis since the line drawn by the statute was drawn explicitly on
the basis of the exercise of that right. Thus, although the statute may have had no actual
deterrent effect on the right to travel, it did draw a line purposefully discriminating against
those exercising their right. The effect was nevertheless important since the Court did require
that the statute penalize the right. 394 U.S. at 634.
64. Id.at 634.
65. Id. at 627-38.

66. Id. at 627-33.
67. Id. at 632-33.
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all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens.
The equal protection clause prohibits such an apportionment of state serv68
ices."
A broad reading of Shapiro, one which tuition residence requirement
challengers immediately seized upon, suggests that any residence requirement
could be construed as penalizing the exercise of the right to travel, thereby
triggering strict scrutiny. The Court, however, explicitly withheld judgment
on durational residence requirements in areas other than welfare benefits.
The Court stated in a footnote:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education,
to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth.
Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one
hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties
upon the exercise of the
69
constitutional right of interstate travel.
The Court thus posited two possible rationales for upholding tuition residence
requirements.
The Court appeared to adopt the broader reading of Shapiro in Dunn v.
Blumstein7 0 and suggested that any interference with the right to interstate
migration would automatically trigger strict scrutiny. The provision attacked
in Dunn imposed a one-year state and a three-month county residence requirement as a prerequisite to voting. 7' The Court employed strict scrutiny
in striking down the durational residence requirement and emphasized that
"durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection
test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such
laws are 'necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.' "72
Furthermore, the Court reinforced the importance of the penalty analysis
employed in Shapiro by refusing to accept Tennessee's suggestion that its
statute could be distinguished from the statute in Shapiro because it did not
actually deter immigration.7 3 The Court stressed that actual deterrence was
not the basis for its holding in Shapiro. Rather, the crucial factor was that
durational residence requirements create classifications that serve to penalize
the right to travel.7 4 Specifically, the Court found that durational residence
laws penalize the right to travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those
persons who have recently exercised that right. In the present case, such

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 638 n.21 (emphasis in original).
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 342 (quoting Shapiro, 304 U.S. at 634).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
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laws forced a person who wished to travel and change residence to choose
75
between travel and the basic right to vote.
Because Shapiro and Dunn each involved more than just the constitutional
right to travel, they suggested that strict scrutiny in right-to-travel cases
should be reserved for situations in which the right to travel is coupled with
another basic right. In Shapiro, the statute denied indigents establishing a
new residence the basic "necessities" for sustaining a household. 76 In Dunn,
the statutes imposing durational residence requirements denied persons their
"fundamental political right" to vote. 7 The Court in Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County78 acknowledged its propensity to couple the right to interstate travel with other "fundamental rights" or "necessities" and in fact
appeared to establish a two-part inquiry to determine whether strict scrutiny
should apply to a durational residence requirement. First, the line or classification must be drawn on the basis of the exercise of the right of interstate
travel. 79 Second, there must be a significant penalty on persons exercising
that right. 80 That is, the exercise of the right to interstate travel must affect
a basic necessity such as the need for welfare, or medical treatment. 8' The
Court, finding that the right to medical treatment was indeed such a necessity,
struck down the Arizona statute requiring one year of residency as a pre82
requisite to free non-emergency medical treatment for indigents.
As this analysis suggests, the Court in Maricopa County adopted a narrower reading of Shapiro than did the Court in Dunn. The Court recognized
the possibility that some durational residence requirements might not substantially penalize the right to travel to the extent necessary to invoke strict
scrutiny.83 In fact, the Court indicated in a footnote that tuition residence
requirements do not deny students the basic necessities of life. 4 The Court
thus made explicit that which it had foreshadowed five years earlier in
Shapiro; namely, that tuition residence requirements might not constitute a
penalty on interstate travel. 85 The Court nevertheless reaffirmed the notion
that neither intent to deter nor actual deterrence of interstate travel was
necessary to invoke strict scrutiny. 86 Rather, as it had in Shapiro and sub-

75. Id. at 342.

76. 394 U.S. at 627.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

405 U.S. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 260 n.15.
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21. See supra text accompanying note 69.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 257-58.
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of the right to travel,
sequent cases, the Court looked to the penalization
87
albeit now requiring a more substantial penalty.
In Sosna v. Iowa,88 the Court appeared to retract a bit from the penalty
analysis outlined in Shapiro and its progeny and began to erode the doctrine
which it later abandoned with its decisions in Zobel and Martinez. The
statute challenged in Sosna imposed a one-year waiting period on new residents before they could obtain a divorce. 9 The Court did not address the
issue of whether the statute constituted a penalty on plaintiff's right to travel
or consider whether the statute deprived plaintiff of a basic necessity or a
fundamental right as required by Maricopa County. Instead, the Court
applied a balancing test, weighing that state's purposes against the inconvenience placed on the individual. 90 The Court decided that the durational
residence requirement could "reasonably be justified" to ensure that a person
seeking a divorce had a modicum of attachment to the state and that the
state's divorce decrees remained free from successful collateral attack. 9'
By using what Justice Marshall in his dissent labeled "an ad hoc balancing
test," 92 the Court deviated sharply from the path plotted in Shapiro for
dealing with residence requirements. The Court's failure to enunciate its
rationale for departing from Shapiro, either by denouncing the penalty
analysis or by distinguishing Sosna as a unique case in which the test is
inapplicable, 93 left its approach to durational residence requirements in a
very uncertain state. The Court did not further clarify this condition until
many years later in Zobel and Martinez.
D.

The More Recent Tuition Residence Requirement Cases

In the midst of the uncertainty generated by these cases, and prior to the
beginning of the erosion of the Shapiro penalty doctrine, courts decided
three of the most influential cases in the specific area of tuition residence
requirements. The first case to analyze tutition residence requirements in
light of the Court's holding in Shapiro was Kirk v. Board of Regents.94 The
statute challenged in Kirk defined a resident student as "any person who
has been a bona fide resident of the [s]tate for more than one year imme-

87. Id. at 257-59.

88. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
89. Id. at 395.
90. Id. at 406-09.
91. Id. at 407.
92. Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Divorce is arguably not a "fundamental right" or a "necessity" as required by Maricopa
County, and is therefore distinguishable. See Recent Developments, supra note 60, at 545. But
cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (filing fees for divorce must be waived for indigents).
94. 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appealdismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
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diately preceding the opening day of a semester during which he proposes
to attend the university." 95 Plaintiff was the wife of a California resident
and therefore presumed she would be classified as a resident for tuition
purposes. 96 When she enrolled at the University of California, however, the
University classified her as a nonresident since she had not met the one-year
residence requirement.9 7 Plaintiff contended, relying on Shapiro, that the
one-year durational residence requirement unconstitutionally infringed on
her constitutional right to travel. 98 She further alleged that the statute violated
the equal protection clause because the infringement was not justified by a
compelling state interest. 99
The California Supreme Court held that the residence reqirement did not
infringe on plaintiff's constitutional right to travel and should therefore be
judged by ordinary equal protection standards.' ° The Court distinguished
Shapiro, pointing out that, unlike Shapiro, this case did not involve the
"immediate and pressing need for preservation of life and health of persons
unable to live without public assistance, and their dependent children."' 0 '
The Court also distinguished a line of cases that held statutes creating
irrebuttable presumptions of nonresidence to be unconstitutional. The Court
held that these cases granted states the unquestioned power to impose "reasonable" residence restrictions. 10 2 After distinguishing these cases, the Court
applied rational basis scrutiny and found that the regulation was reasonably
related to the state's legitimate objective of achieving partial cost equalization. 0 The Court noted that although Shapiro rejected such an interest
as not compelling, the Court's holding was limited to cases like Shapiro
which involved benefits essential to life and health.1 4 The Court concluded
that such an interest may well be a legitimate state interest for the purpose
of the rational basis test. 05

95. Id. at 433, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 437, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 438-39, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
101. Id.
102. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Newman v.
Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960).
103. The court found the regulation reasonably related to the state's objective of:
[achieving partial cost equalization by] collecting lower tuition fees from those
persons who, directly or indirectly, have recently made some contribution to the
economy of the state through having been employed, having paid taxes, or having
spent money in the state for the brief period of one year prior to their attendance
at a publicly financed institution of higher education.
Kirk, 273 Cal. App. 2d at 444, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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The Supreme Court added its approval to the California court's reasoning
when it summarily affirmed the decision of a federal district court in Minnesota in the case of Starns v. Malkerson.'06 The statute challenged in Starns
was very similar to that challenged in Kirk. The statute specified:
No student is eligible for resident classification in the University, in any
college thereof, unless he has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state
for at least a year immediately prior thereto. This requirement does not
prejudice the right of a student admitted on a nonresident basis to be
placed thereafter on a resident basis provided he has acquired a bona
fide domicile of a year's duration within the state. Attendance at the
University neither constitutes nor necessarily precludes the acquisition of
such a domicile. For University purposes, a student does not acquire a
domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a year primarily
as a permanent resident and not merely as a student; this involves the
probability of his remaining in Minnesota beyond his completion of
school. 07
The district court stated the sole issue to be whether it was "constitutionally
permissible for a state to create an irrebuttablepresumption that any person
who has not continuously resided in Minnesota for one year before entering
the University is a nonresident for tuition purposes."' 08
Plaintiffs, again relying on Shapiro, asserted that the statute infringed
upon their constitutional right to interstate travel and should therefore be
scrutinized under the stricter "compelling state interest" test.' °9 The court,
however, refused to apply strict scrutiny and distinguished Shapiro in two
ways. First, the court pointed out that the statute challenged in Shapiro,
imposing a one-year waiting period for welfare benefits, had the specific
objective of excluding from the jurisdiction the poor who needed or might
need relief." 0 The statute imposing a one-year waiting period for tuition
preference at issue in Starns, however, did not have the specific objective
of excluding or even deterring out-of-state students from attending the university and thus did not chill a person's right to travel."' The second
distinction pointed out by the court was similar to that made by the California
court in Kirk. The statute in Shapiro had the effect of denying the basic
necessities of life to needy residents. The tuition statute in Starns, on the
other hand, was not shown to have any dire effects on nonresident students
and therefore would be less likely to make a person hesitate when deciding
to establish residence in Minnesota and apply to the university." 2

106. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
107. Id. at 235-36 (emphasis added). Again, the statute is set out at length because of the
importance of the language for later analysis.
108. Id.at 236-37 (emphasis added).
109. Id.at 237.
110. Id.
11. Id.at 237-38.
112. Id.at 238.
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The court recognized that the regulation discriminated against the class
of residents who had established bona fide residence in the state but who
had been in the state for less than one year." 3 But, having distinguished
Shapiro and decided there was no infringement upon the constitutional right
to interstate travel, the court upheld the regulation under the rational basis
standard of scrutiny." 4 The court found that it was reasonable to presume
that a person who had not resided within the state for one year was a
nonresident student. 1 5 Furthermore, it was reasonable to require that to
rebut this presumption the student must be a bona fide domiciliary of the
6
state for one year."
In addition to finding the above presumptions reasonable, the court held
that the regulatory classification was reasonably related to a legitimate objective of the State of Minnesota.'1 7 The primary justification the defendants
offered was that the one-year waiting period was a rational attempt by the
state to equalize the cost of a college education for those individuals not
recently contributing to the state's economy through employment, tax payments, and expenditures therein." 8 The court again relied on the reasoning
in Kirk, stating:
as we read Shapiro v. Thompson, while the payment of taxes, fiscal
integrity and budgetary planning are expressly rejected either as "traditional equal protection tests" or as "compelling state interests" that
justify the imposition of benefits essential to life and health, they may
well be reasonably related to legitimate objectives of the State ... for
the purpose of imposing residence conditions on attendance at a University or state college." 9
The court in Starns thus believed that the state had the right to say that
new residents of the state shall make some contribution, tangible or intangible, toward the state's welfare for a period of twelve months before
becoming entitled to enjoy the same privileges that long-term residents possess
20
to attend the university at a reduced fee.
The United States Supreme Court finally considered a tuition residence
requirement in Vlandis v. Kline.' 2' The Connecticut statute challenged in

113. Id. at 238-39.
114. Id. at 239.

115. Id. at 240. The court also distinguished Carrington v. Rash and its application of the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine. The presumption in the Minnesota statute, unlike that in
Carrington,could be overcome if the student provided sufficient evidence to show he was a
bona fide domiciliary of the state, one element of which is proof that he resided within the
state for a period of one year. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 241.
118. Id. at 240.
119. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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Vlandis presumed that, for tuition purposes, the status of state university
students as nonresidents at the time of application for admission conclusively
and irrebuttably continued for the entire period of attendance.' 22 The Court
characterized the issue as being whether a conclusive and unchallengeable
presumption of nonresidence was unconstitutional in that it denied an opportunity to rebut the presumption. 23 The Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment did not permit a state to deny an
individual the opportunity to present evidence that he was a bona fide resident
entitled to in-state status on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable
presumption of nonresidence. 24 When that presumption is not necessarily
or universally true in fact and when the state has reasonable alternative
means for making the crucial determination, such a conclusive presumption
25
is unconstitutional.
In striking down the statute, the Court observed that it had long disfavored
such irrebuttable presumptions under the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, and that the Court previously found such presumptions unconstitutional.' 2 6 The state proffered three reasons in justification of the permanent irrebuttable presumption, each of which the Supreme
Court rejected. First, the state suggested that it had a valid interest in
equalizing the cost of a college education between residents and nonresidents
and that freezing a student's residential status ensures that bona fide instate students will receive their full subsidy. 27 The Court found that, although
such an interest may well be legitimate, the state used a criterion wholly
unrelated to that objective.' 2 Second, the state argued that even if a student
applying from out of state might at some point become a bona fide resident
of Connecticut, the state could nevertheless reasonably decide to favor only
29
its established residents whose past tax contributions to the state were higher.1
The Court refused to even countenance this justification since Connecticut's
scheme made no distinction on its face between established and new residents.3 0 Finally, the Court rejected the state's argument that the presumption

122. Id. at 442-43.

123. Id. at 443.
124. Id. at 452.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 446. See cases cited supra note 102.
127. Id. at 448.
128. Id. at 448-49. Instead of ensuring that only its bona fide residents receive their full
subsidy, the statute ensures that certain of its bona fide residents do not receive their full
subsidy.
129. Id. at 449. Zobel later held this justification to be not even legitimate, thereby undermining much of the logic relied on in these tuition residence cases. Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 63 (1982).
130. Vandis, 412 U.S. at 449. The refusal of these justifications indicates that the Court
may have been applying something more than rational basis scrutiny since these justifications
were held to be at least "legitimate" in Kirk and Starns.
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provided administrative ease because administrative ease alone did not save
the conclusive presumption from invalidity under the due process clause
when other reasonable alternative means for determining bona fide residence
3
were available.' '
The real importance of this case lies in the additional guidance the Court
provided for future cases by qualifying the above holding. The Court recognized that special problems exist in determining the bona fide residence of outof-state college students. 3 2 For this reason, the Court suggested that its
decision should not be construed to deny a state "the right to impose on a
student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable
durational residence requirement, which can be met while in student status.' ' 33 The Court added that "[t]he State can establish such reasonable
criteria for in-state status as to make virtually certain that students who are
not, in fact, bona fide residents of the state, but who have come there solely
for educational purposes, cannot take advantage of in-state rates.", 31 Moreover, the Court drew from the Connecticut Attorney General's opinion which
recognized that, in reviewing a claim of in-state status, the issue becomes
essentially one of domicile, and suggested certain criteria to use in determining the intent element of domicile. 35 These criteria included year-round
residence, voter registration, place of filing tax returns, property ownership,
36
driver's license, car registration, and marital status.
In addition to qualifying its holding in this manner, the Court distinguished
Starns by pointing out that, under the statute attacked in Starns, a student
could rebut the presumption of nonresidence after having lived in the state
for one year by presenting other evidence sufficient to show bona fide
domicile within Minnesota. 3 7 Thus, "residence within the state for one year,
whether or not in student status, was merely one element which Minnesota
required to demonstrate bona fide domicile." 38 Under Connecticut's scheme,
a student applying from out of state could never quaify as a resident so
39
long as he retained student status.
Two Justices, although concurring with the result in Vlandis, refused to
go along with this distinction and openly questioned the result in Starns. 40
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, explicitly asserted that
he joined the opinion of the Court "except insofar as it suggests that a State

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 451.
at 452.
(emphasis added).
at 453-54.
at 454.
at 452 n.9.
at 454 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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may impose a one-year residency requirement as a prerequisite to qualifying
for in-state tuition benefits."' 4' He noted that because the Court found
sufficient basis in the due process clause to dispose of the constitutionality
of the statute in question it had no occasion to address the serious equal
protection questions raised by this and other tuition residence laws. 42 Justice
White, writing a separate concurring opinion, likewise expressed uneasiness
about even a one-year conclusive presumption.' 4 3 His uneasiness stemmed
from his difficulty in distinguishing, on due process grounds, between the
Minnesota one-year requirement and the Connecticut law which did not
permit a person to acquire Connecticut residency while attending Connecticut
schools.'"
It is thus apparent that, while the Supreme Court dealt explicitly with
tuition residence requirements in Vlandis, the Court is reluctant to paint
with a broad brush in the area of tuition residence requirements and remains
somewhat uncertain as to the underlying themes which should direct its
decisions. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer from the cases analyzing
tuition residence requirements in light of Shapiro that the Court's decision
in Shapiro had little net effect on the results courts would reach in scrutinizing
such statutes or regulations. Courts appear to shun the idea of applying
strict scrutiny to tuition residence requirements, and distinguish Shapiro and
its progeny as either dealing with necessities, or as dealing with statutes
having the specific objective of discouraging the exercise of the right to
travel.' 45 Moreover, the primary justification for such statutes-rewarding
citizens for past contributions-although not compelling, may at least be
legitimate in the area of tuition residence requirements.1 4 When courts are
willing to strike down tuition residence requirements, they will apparently
limit themselves to statutes which create an irrebuttable presumption of
47
nonresidence for the duration of the student's academic career.

141. Id. at 454-55.
142. Id. at 455. The due process basis referred to was, of course, the fact that the statute
created an irrebuttable presumption.
143. Id. at 456 (White, J., concurring).
144. Id. A commentator has suggested that a reasonable extension of the Vlandis decision
should profess that any university requirement that does not allow a student to demonstrate
prior to the start of any semester that he has become a resident of the state and thereby
qualifies for lower tuition is subject to a successful due process and equal protection attack.
Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law, 51 J. URB. LAW 757, 763 (1974). Although this might
provide challengers a possible line of attack, given the alignment of the Justices in Vlandis,
the attack would not appear likely to succeed. Furthermore, the Court's subsequent decisions
in Zobel and Martinez provide a more plausible argument. See also Podger v. Indiana Univ.,
178 Ind. App. 245, 381 N.E.2d 1274 (1978) (rejecting a similar attack). It is also worth noting
that some bona fide residence requirements are invalid under the privileges and immunities
clause. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985) (invalidating New
Hampshire residence requirement for eligibility to take state bar exam).
145. See supra notes 101-05, 109-16 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 104-05, 117-19 and accompanying text.
147. See Vlandis, 412 U.S. 441.
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Shapiro thus never bore the fruit tuition residence requirement challengers
hoped for. Courts refused to apply strict scrutiny to such residence requirements. Rather, courts reached results strongly paralleling those reached in
early cases decided before the recognition of a possible link between durational residence requirements and the right to interstate travel. Despite the
limited success of challengers, several questions remained unanswered in the
area of durational residence requirements, especially in light of the Court's
apparent erosion of the Shapiroanalysis in areas other than tuition residence
requirements. In short, the legal community obviously still needed an additional word regarding durational residence requirements in general, and
148
tuition residence requirements specifically.

II.

ZOBEL AND MARTINEZ

The Supreme Court provided additional clarification in these areas with
its decisions in Zobel v. Williams 49 and Martinez v. Bynum. 50 These two
cases shed considerable doubt on the validity of Shapiro as applied to
durational residence requirements, and in so doing, call into question the
decisions made following Shapiro in the area of tuition residence requirements. Zobel and Martinez hold that durationalresidence requirements are
unconstitutional, except to the extent that they serve merely as a test of
bona fide residence. Put differently, these cases imply that anything other
than a bona fide residence requirement may amount to an unconstitutional
deprivation of the right of freedom to travel.
As discussed previously,' durational residence requirements, such as the
one upheld in Starns, require that a student be a bona fide resident-of a
state for a certain period of time before demanding privileges restricted to
that state's residents. Bona fide residence requirements, on the other hand,
merely require that a person does establish residence before demanding
resident privileges. Establishing bona fide residence necessitates meeting essentially the same requirements required to establish domicile. That is, a
person must be present in the state with the intention of remaining indefinitely.' 52 It is precisely this distinction between bona fide and durational
residence requirements which the Court went to great lengths to articulate
in Zobel and Martinez. In so doing, the Court apparently recharacterized
Shapiro and its progeny as also emphasizing the distinction between durational and bona fide residence requirements. The crucial element in those
cases, therefore, is no longer the penalty analysis but the distinction between

148. Recent Decisions, supra note 143, at 765.
149. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
150. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).

151. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
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bona fide and durational residence requirements. In abandoning the rationale
underlying the tuition cases decided in light of Shapiro, the Court rekindled
the possibility of successful challenges to certain tuition residence requirements.
A.

Zobel v. Williams: The Erosion Begins

In response to a unique situation, namely the discovery of large oil reserves
on state-owned lands, 53 Alaska "took steps to assure that its current good
fortune [would] bring long-range benefits."'' 54 To accomplish this, Alaska
in 1976 adopted a constitutional amendment establishing a permanent fund
into which the state was required to deposit at least 25 percent of its mineral
income each year.' 5 In 1980 the Alaska legislature enacted a dividend scheme
to distribute a portion of the fund's earnings directly to the state's adult
residents. 56 The plan required that a person be 18 years old and an Alaska
resident to receive the available dividend. 5 7 Although there was no durational
residence requirement, the law provided ranging benefits depending on the
length of residency in Alaska since 1959,158 thereby disadvantaging new
arrivals as compared to longer-term residents.
Had the Court analyzed this distribution scheme under the doctrines enunciated in Shapiro and its progeny, the Court would likely have applied the
rational basis level of scrutiny and upheld the statute. In order to trigger
strict scrutiny under Shapiro, especially as clarified in Maricopa County, a
statute had to draw a line based on a person's exercise of the right to travel
and impose a substantial penalty on that exercise. 59 In Zobel, although the
statute drew a line on the basis of the exercise of the right to move to
Alaska, the classification did not impose a penalty on the exercise of that
right. That is, it did not deprive someone of a basic necessity. In fact, as
Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, if anything, the prospect of receiving
annual cash dividends would encourage immigration to Alaska.160 Thus,
under the penalty analysis of Shapiro, the statute should have been subject
to rational basis scrutiny.
Rather than take this approach, however, the majority opinion by Chief
Justice Burger failed to refer to the penalty analysis. In fact, the majority
opinion did not even articulate the level of scrutiny necessary to evaluate
the statute in question. Instead, the Court struck down the statute without
153. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 56.
154. Id. at 57.
155. Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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deciding what level of scrutiny applied because it found that the statute
6
failed to meet even the minimum rationality tests.' '
The most important aspect of the Court's opinion was its explicit effort
to distinguish the statute in question from those analyzed in Shapiro and
its progeny.' 62 The Court pointed out that the statute in question did not
purport to establish a test of bona fide residence like the statutes in Shapiro
and the other cases. 63 Rather, the statute created permanent distinctions
between classes of concededly bona fide residents based on the length of
residence in the state.' 6 ' This distinction, in effect, recharacterized the holdings
of Shapiro and subsequent cases because the Court now apparently viewed
the durational residence requirements in those cases as merely assuring that
a person was a bona fide resident of the state. In actuality, the durational
residence requirements involved in Shapiro and later residence requirement
cases had other purposes, such as discouraging indigents from immigrating,
and benefitting longer-term residents. 6 5 These requirements were never justified solely as a test of bona fide residence. Nevertheless, in making the
distinction, the Court chose to recharacterize the cases as distinguishing
between bona fide and durational residence requirements. This distinction,
however, revealed only the tip of the iceberg.
The remainder of the Court's opinion unveils some of the further implications of its decision. The state advanced three purposes justifying the
distribution made by the dividend program: "(a) creation of a financial
incentive for individuals to establish and maintain residence in Alaska; (b)
encouragement of prudent management of the Permanent Fund; and (c)
apportionment of benefits in recognition of undefined 'contributions of
various kinds, both tangible and intangible, which residents made during
their years of residency.' ,166 The Court held that the first two justifications
were not rationally related to the distinctions Alaska sought to make between
newer and longer-term residents. 67 First, a differential between new and old
residents was not necessary to create an incentive for individuals to establish
and maintain residency. 68 Similarly, the Court found that the purpose of
encouraging prudent management of the fund was not rationally furthered
by increasing the dividend for each year of residency since statehood. 69 This
was not a typical application of the rational basis test which generally entails
deferring to the legislature's decision as to how much of a problem to confront,

161.Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.

at
at
at
at

60-61.
63.
58-59.
59.

165. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
166. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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and thus permits a statute to be substantially over- or underinclusive. 70
The Court found that the last of the state's objectives, rewarding citizens
for past contributions, was not even a legitimate state purpose.' 7 ' The Court
relied on Shapiro which held that such an interest was not a compelling
72
state interest, though in the very different context dealing with necessities.
Previous tuition cases had relied primarily on the fact that such an interest
7
was at least legitimate in distinguishing Shapiro and upholding the statutes.
By relying on Shapiro for the notion that rewarding citizens for past contributions was not even a legitimate state interest, the Court in Zobel abandoned much of the logic supporting decisions in tuition cases. The Court
reasoned:
If the States can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length
of residence, what would preclude varying university tuition on a sliding
scale based on years of residence-or even limiting access to finite public
facilities, eligibility for student loans, for civil service jobs, or for government contracts by length of domicile? Could States impose different
taxes based on length of residence? Alaska's reasoning could open the
door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits and services according to the length of residency. It would permit the states to divide
citizens into expanding numbers
of permanent classes. Such a result would
7
be clearly impermissible.

4

The Court, citing Vlandis, emphasized that the equal protection clause prohibits such an apportionment of services. 7 5 Moreover, recognizing the implications of its holding and logic, the Court explicitly called into question
the reasoning, though not the result, in Starns. 76 The Court stated in a
footnote:
Starns v. Malkerson... cannot be read as a contrary decision of this Court.
First, summary affirmance by this Court is not to be read as an adoption
of the reasoning supporting the judgement under review ....
Moreover
... we considered the Minnesota one-year residency requirement [for in-

170. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Lindsley v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). Perhaps the stricter than usual scrutiny employed by the Court
can be explained by the "right to travel" implications in this case. As noted previously, the
right to interstate travel is recognized as a full-fledged constitutional right. See supra note 60
and accompanying text. This appears to be part of a recent trend in Supreme Court analysis
to apply rational basis scrutiny with more than the traditional amount of "bite." See, e.g.,
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (invalidating zoning ordinance prohibiting group home for the mentally retarded under rational basis test).
171. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63.
172. Id.
173. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 437-39, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 264-66
(1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
174. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 64.
175. Id.at 63.
176. Id. at 64 n.13.
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state tuition benefits] examined in Starns a test of bona fide residence,
not a return on prior contributions to the commonweal.'77
The Court thus explicitly recharacterized the reasoning of the decision in
Starns-tuition residence requirements may serve as a test of bona fide
residence, but not a return on past contributions.
Four concurring Justices were more forceful in their rejection of durational
residence requirements.178 Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell joined in concurring, stated that he found it difficult
to escape from the recognition that underlying any scheme of classification
on the basis of duration of residence one almost invariably finds the "unstated premise that some citizens are more equal than others."' 79 Justice
Brennan felt that most forms of discrimination based upon length of residency were rejected with the adoption of the equal protection clause.' 80 He
too, however, recognized that "length of residence may, for example, be
used to test the bona fides of citizenship."' 8'
Based upon the logic enunciated in this case, both in the majority and
the concurring opinions, one could plausibly maintain that any durational
tuition residence requirement is invalid unless it is designed solely to insure
that a person is a bona fide resident of the state (i.e. is present in the state
and intends to remain indefinitely).' 82 Brennan states this explicitly,'83 while
Burger more tacitly suggests a disapproval of the reasoning in Starns.'1
Zobel thus represents an erosion of the logic employed in Shapiro and its
progeny. The situation involved in Zobel was, however, unique in that the
statute discriminated retrospectively between classes of admittedly bona fide
residents. For this reason, arguing for an extension of its logic to other
types of durational residence requirements might not meet with guaranteed
success.' 8 One commentator did, in fact, suggest that these considerations
86
require that the Zobel holding be limited to its facts.'
B.

Martinez v. Bynum: Erosion Completed

The Court chose, however, not to limit Zobel to its facts. Rather, with
its decision in Martinez v. Bynum,' 87 the Court explicitly adopted the rule

177. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 65 (Brennan, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 71.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 70.
182. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
183. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 64 n.13.
185. See Comment, Splitting Up Alaska's Oil Wealth Pie: The Constitutionality of Accumulative Residency Requirements After Zobel v. Williams, 12 [UCLA]-ALASKA L. Rav. 119
(1983).
186. Id. at 132-35.
187. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
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that any durational residence requirement is invalid unless designed solely
to assure that a person is a bona fide resident of the state.' 8 In so doing,
the Court in Martinez completed its erosion and recharacterization of the
Shapiro penalty analysis in the area of durational residence requirements
and opened the door to possibly successful challenges of tuition residence
requirements in at least some circumstances.
The Martinez case arose in response to a much more conventional state
of affairs than Zobel. The Texas Educational Code provision challenged in
Martinez denied tuition-free admission to the Texas public schools to a
minor who lived apart from a parent or guardian if his presence in the
school district was for the primary purpose of attending free public schools.'8 9
Roberto Morales, a young child born in the United States and thus a United
States citizen by birth, left his parents, both Mexican citizens, to live with
his sister in the United States for the primary purpose of attending school.' 90
His sister, Oralia Martinez, was his custodian, but she did not wish to
become his legal guardian.' 9' Because he did not reside with his parents or
guardian in the school district, and because he was in Texas for the primary
purpose of attending school, the statute denied Morales tuition-free admission
to the Texas schools.' 92 Martinez made a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute that denied her brother tuition-free access to the
public schools.' 9
The Court upheld the statute against the petitioner's challenge.' 94 The
Court began, as it had in Zobel, by emphasizing that it was always careful
to distinguish durational residence requirements from bona fide residence
requirements.' 9 The Court referred again to language in Shapiro which
stressed that "the residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period
requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites for assistance" and
pointed out that the Court in Shapiro carefully "implied no view of the
validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining ... eligibility for tuition-free education .... ,,196
The Court thus held again, in a
much broader context than it had in Zobel, that a bona fide residence
requirement, as opposed to a durational residence requirement, was valid.
The Court found that such a requirement furthers the substantial state interest
in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by its

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at

329.
323.
322-23.
323.

192. Id.
193. Id.at 325.
194. Id.at 333.
195. Id.at 325.
196. Id.at 326 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969) (emphasis in
original)).
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residents. 97 Furthermore, a bona fide residence requirement does not burden
the constitutional right of interstate travel since a person is free to move to
a state and establish residence there.' 98 Rather, "[a] bona fide residence
requirement simply requires that the person does establish residence before
demanding the services that are restricted to residents."'9 This reasoning
reinforces the conclusion suggested by Zobel that the Court has abandoned
the rationale for its holdings in Shapiro and subsequent cases.
Because such bona fide residence requirements are indeed constitutional
if appropriately defined and universally applied, 200 the central question in
analyzing a residence requirement in light of Zobel and Martinez becomes
whether the residence requirement is in fact a bona fide residence requirement. 20 ' In deciding whether a residence requirement is in fact a constitutional
bona fide residence requirement, the Court in Martinez essentially equated
residency with domicile. 20 2 A statute, therefore, which merely insures that a
person is a domiciliary-is present in the state and intends to remain indefinitely-will be a bona fide residence requirement. 20 3 Thus, if a statute
or regulation imposes a waiting period, that period acts solely as a test of
bona fide residency. In terms of domicile, a waiting period will be constitutional only to the extent that it serves to insure that a person is present
in the state with the intent to remain indefinitely.
In Martinez, the Court found that the Texas statute was even more
generous than necessary to survive the above test.20 The statute compelled
a school district to permit a child to attend school tuition-free if he had a
bona fide intention to remain indefinitely; that is, if he had a reason for
being there other than his desire to attend school. 20 5 The statute went even
further than this, however, and allowed some children to attend school
without paying tuition even if they did not intend to remain in the school
district indefinitely. 206 For example, if the child's parents went to Texas to
work for only a year, the child, although not a domiciliary, would be eligible
for tuition-free admission since he would be present in the school district
20 7
with his parents.
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III.

IMPACT

The significance of the Court's reasoning to the analysis of tuition residence
requirements is obvious. Because any statute that does more than merely
ensure physical presence and intent to remain indefinitely discriminates against
some bona fide residents by denying them the privileges they deserve as bona
fide state residents, any tuition statute or regulation which imposes a waiting
period for eligibility for in-state tuition is questionable. This is so because
any waiting period creates two classes of "nonresidents": (1) those who are
true nonresidents and have no intention of remaining in the state indefinitely,
and (2) those who are bona fide residents and do intend to remain in the
state indefinitely, but who have not yet lived in the state for the requisite
time period. Thus, any waiting period, even if only one day, has some
discriminatory impact.
The issue then becomes whether the waiting period can be justified as
merely a test of bona fide residency. This will invariably entail some sort
of precarious line-drawing by the Court, which will involve balancing two
competing policies: the administrative convenience inherent in a generalized
inflexible waiting period, and the opportunity for more accurate individualized determinations inherent in a case-by-case approach. Obviously the
Court would tolerate some overinclusiveness in a tuition residence requirement since, as described above, any waiting period may serve to prevent
some bona fide residents from qualifying for in-state tuition rates. The
question is the extent of overinclusiveness the Court will tolerate in the area
of tuition residence requirements.
Arguably, even a one-year waiting period such as that upheld in Starns,
Kirk, and Bryan acts as more than a test of bona fide residence since it
denies some bona fide residents in-state tuition. In fact, given the tendency
of students to move into a state solely to attend college, the tuition context
is markedly different from other "right-to-travel" contexts such as the voting, welfare, and Alaska cases which involve people moving when there is
no real reason to suspect a merely temporary relocation. In other words,
the reasonable suspicion of a merely temporary relocation by students suggests that any sort of waiting period is an unrealistic indicator of actual
domicile since students with three years in-state may be no more domiciled
in the state than other students with three months or less of residency. 2°
This, arguably, makes any particulartime limit such as three months, one
year, or three years no more or less arbitrary than any other. If this is so,
then perhaps individual determinations are the only meaningful test of actual
bona fide residence since any specific waiting period is virtually meaningless

208. See supra text accompanying note 133.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:287/

and since we cannot constitutionally tolerate an indefinite waiting period.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court provided some indication as to how much
overinclusiveness it will tolerate in the area of tuition residence requirements
when it stated in Vlandis:
[a state's] legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the right of its
own bona fide residents to attend college on a preferential tuition basis
permits a State to establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as
to make virtually certain that students who are not bona fide residents
of the State but who have come there solely for educational purposes
cannot take advantage of the out-of-state rate.209

Since states may make "virtually certain ' 210 that students are bona fide
residents, it is clear that, in the area of tuition residence requirements, the
Court will tolerate a fair amount of overinclusiveness. More importantly,
this fact taken in conjunction with the Court's reaffirmance in Zobel of
Minnesota's one-year waiting period which it recharacterized as "a test of
bona fide residence, ' 21 1 indicates that a one-year waiting period is a reasonable test of bona fide residence.
Beyond the one-year requirement which the Court clearly recharacterized
and accepted as "a test of bona fide residence, not a return on prior
contributions to the commonwealth ' 212 lies a grey area of other requirements
upon which the Court has yet to comment since Zobel and Martinez. The
analysis in Zobel and Martinez suggests that one typical requirement lying
in this zone of uncertainty may now be especially vulnerable as more than
a test of bona fide residence. These tuition residence requirements contain
two distinct provisions. First, they impose a waiting period, for example,
one year. Second, they specify that physical presence in the state for the
predominantpurpose of attending a college or university or other institution
of higher3 education shall not be counted towards the specified waiting
21
period.

209. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1973).
210. Id. at 453.

211. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 n.13 (1982).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g.,

INDIANA UNIVERSITY, INDIANA UNIVERSITY STUDENT HANDBOOK, Rules

Deter-

mining Resident and Nonresident Student Status for Indiana University Fee Purposes (1984)
providing:
A person entering the state from another state or country does not at that time
acquire residence ...such person must be a resident for twelve (12) months in
order to qualify as a resident student for fee purposes ....Physical presence in
Indiana for the predominant purpose of attending a college, university, or other
institution of higher education, shall not be counted in determining the twelve
(12) month period of residence ....

Id. at 279 (emphasis in original). See also supra notes 48 and 107 and accompanying text.
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At least one court upheld such a tuition residence requirement prior to
Zobel and Martinez."4 Again, however, Zobel and Martinez undermine the
reasoning by which the court upheld the requirement. Residence requirements

may no longer be justified as rewarding citizens for past contributions, the
primary justification courts relied on in the area of tuition residence requirements. 25 Rather, such tuition216residence requirements are acceptable only
as a test of bona fide residence.
As noted above, the Court appears willing to accept some overinclusiveness
21 7
in the area of tuition residence requirements given its language in Vlandis.
If, however, the distinction between durational and bona fide residence

requirements is to have any meaning at all in this area, a requirement which
refuses to count physical presence for the predominant purpose of attending
a university towards a specified waiting period must almost certainly be
unconstitutional in light of Zobel and Martinez. Such a requirement does
far more than act as a test of bona fide residence. In fact, such a requirement
is so overinclusive as to effectively preclude all bona fide residents who
applied from out of state from ever being considered bona fide residents

during their academic careers, because the students' predominant purpose
for being in the state, even if they are bona fide residents, is to attend a
university. Such a requirement thus has the same effect as the irrebuttable
presumption held unconstitutional in Vlandis.21s If an individual's primary
purpose for being in a state is to obtain an education, such a requirement
renders the person a nonresident for tuition purposes regardless of her actual
domicile. The argument that such a residence requirement is unconstitutional
is further bolstered by the Court's statement in Vlandis that its decision

should not "be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student,
as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational

residency requirement, which can be met while in student status.' ' 21 9 The

214. Podger v. Indiana Univ., 178 Ind. App. 245, 381 N.E.2d 1274 (1978). The court in
Podger held that such a requirement did not impose a permanent and irrebuttable presumption
of nonresidence as did the requirement in Vlandis. Id. at 264, 381 N.E.2d at 1286. Such a
requirement may nevertheless be attacked on different grounds in light of Zobel and Martinez.
215. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 240-41 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem.,
401 U.S. 985 (1971).
216. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
217. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 453-54. "The State can establish such reasonable criteria for instate status as to make virtually certain that certain students who are not, in fact, bona fide
residents of the State, but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take
advantage of the in-state rates." Id.
218. Id. at 442-43, 453-54. A statute or regulation providing that physical presence in the
state "for the predominant purpose of attending a college" will not be counted towards a
specified waiting period could be construed so as to avoid the constitutional problem. For
example, the student's "primary purpose" could be viewed as being to live and remain in the state
even though now in fact attending school. Cf. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (refusing
to take this approach and instead reaching the constitutional issue).
219. 421 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added).
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Court in Vlandis thus recognized the grave injustice that can be worked by
prohibiting all out-of-state students from ever acquiring in-state status "while
220
in student status.
CONCLUSION

Courts have analyzed tuition residence requirements under numerous
standards. Courts initially rejected most challenges under the rational basis
test, holding that such requirements were reasonably related to the legitimate
state interest of rewarding citizens for past contributions. Challengers later
sought stricter judicial scrutiny under the Shapiro penalty analysis. Courts
refused, however, to extend the Shapiro doctrine to the area of tuition
residence requirements, apparently diminishing the hope of successful attacks
on such requirements.
The Supreme Court's two recent decisions in Zobel and Martinez shed
doubt on much of the reasoning underlying earlier decisions. More specifically, the Court abandoned the Shapiro penalty analysis, and now holds
that rewarding citizens for past contirbutions is not even a legitimate interest
sufficient to support a tuition residence requirement under the rational basis
test. Rather, any durational residence requirement is justifiable only to the
extent that it serves as a test of bona fide residence. Some tuition residence
requirements-those which refuse to count time spent in the state for the
predominant purpose of attending a university towards a specified waiting
period-are more restrictive than necessary to serve solely as a test of bona
fide residence. For this reason, such residence requirements would appear
to be unconstitutional under the framework of Zobel and Martinez.
Whether courts will indeed reach the conclusion suggested by the Supreme
Court's current analysis remains to be seen. What is clear is that at a bare
minimum, the Court's decisions in Zobel and Martinez recharacterize the
reasoning supporting the decisions in Shapiro and the tuition cases. Tuition
residence requirements may no longer be justified as a reward to citizens
for past contributions. Rather, such requirements are justifiable only to the
extent that they truly test the bona fides of residency. Legislative and academic bodies must, therefore, be more cautious and draft tuition residence
requirements which perform only the constitutionally permitted function of
testing bona fide residence.

THoMAs B. PARENT

220. Id. This analysis may have implications beyond the area of tuition residence requirements, since, as noted above, the Court has recharacterized the line of cases dealing with
necessities and the right to travel as merely distinguishing between durational and bona fide
residence requirements.

